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Abstract: 
 
The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that 
determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive 
process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been 
obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural 
model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the 
relationship between the degree of perceived competition – not only from local firms but from 
firms in other regions – and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in 
aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. 
Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces 
market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on 
production costs is unclear. 
 
Key words:  spatial competition, agglomeration, conjectural variations. 
JEL classification codes: F15, L11, L22, L23, L60, R15, R32 
 
Resumen: 
 
La literatura de la Nueva Geografía Económica permite analizar con detalle los factores que 
determinan las decisiones de localización de las empresas en mercados integrados, pero en 
estos modelos el proceso competitivo se modela de manera rudimentaria. Además, la 
evidencia empírica normalmente se ha obtenido a partir de especificaciones  econométricas en 
forma reducida. En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo estructural donde se tienen en cuenta 
las interacciones estratégicas entre las empresas. Se investiga la relación entre el grado de 
competencia percibida, no sólo localmente sino también con respecto a industrias localizadas 
en otras regiones, y la concentración geográfica. Los resultados preliminares indican que, en 
términos agregados, la intensidad de la competencia local es más fuerte que la presión 
competitiva ejercida por industrias distantes. Además, se confirma que una mayor 
concentración geográfica de la producción reduce el poder del mercado debido a la 
intensificación de la competencia local, pero al mismo tiempo su impacto en los costes de la 
producción es ambiguo. 
 
Palabras clave: competencia espacial, aglomeración, variaciones conjeturales. 
Códigos de clasificación JEL: F15, L11, L22, L23, L60, R15, R32 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the context of the industrial change that has characterized the last two decades, one of the 
corporate strategies implemented in order to adapt to the uncertainty of the markets and to 
reduce production costs has involved breaking down the productive process into a growing 
number of phases. These phases are usually carried out in separate establishments of 
decreasing average size, belonging to the same multiplant firm or to separate productive 
entities. This split in the value chain breaks up tasks that used to be integrated and increases 
the technical, functional and spatial division of labour. At the same time it favours the 
emergence of small specialized firms that act as suppliers and/or clients, creating networks of 
inter- and intra-firm linkages. This new model of industrial organization, based on the concept 
of productive decentralization, vertical disintegration and fragmentation, has clear 
implications for the spatial distribution of productive activities. 
 
Since the second half of the eighties international trade and, most importantly, flows of 
foreign direct investment have emerged as new forms of international cooperation between 
firms. These characteristics of the internationalization of the economy are inherent in the 
globalization process and are the consequence of the reduction of tariff barriers, the 
progressive elimination of commercial restrictions and advances in transport and 
communications. All these developments facilitate the dispersion of economic activity,  
accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and technology, and promote integration on a 
worldwide scale. In the specific case of the European Union, the emergence of new 
competitors in international markets and the opening up and reorientation of East European 
countries has accentuated the pressure of globalization, while greater integration has 
eliminated commercial barriers between member countries, has created a single market and, 
in its latest phase, has allowed the adoption of a common currency. 
 
Both the processes of European integration and globalization have radically changed the 
competitive environment of EU industry. Not only has the scope of competition changed, but 
its nature as well: the search for cost reduction has been replaced by the pressure to produce 
high quality goods, forcing firms to seek continuous improvements in their products and 
processes, and to make a greater commitment to innovation by entering into cooperation 
agreements both with suppliers and with clients. In this context, firms’ location decisions are 
increasingly determined by the external context and by economies of scale that tend to 
promote geographical concentration. 
 
From the theoretical perspective, new economic geography (NEG) analyses the centripetal 
forces that induce firms to agglomerate in space and the centrifugal forces that encourage 
them to separate. As Krugman (1995) argues, the main difficulties of traditional location 
theory lie in the assumed market structure. The analysis of economic geography requires the 
existence of imperfect competition and returns to scale that can be better described using the 
tools provided by the theory of industrial organization. 
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In this paper we ask whether European integration has caused a true unification of the market 
and whether it has removed the asymmetries existing between local production conditions. 
We also consider whether the envisaged changes in productive conditions will affect location 
decisions, thus promoting a greater geographic concentration within EU member states, or 
whether, on the contrary, they will generate dispersion forces that will tend to equalize the 
spatial distribution of economic activities. Regional differences in wages and productivity are 
critical when studying location decisions and difficult to eliminate due to the limited labour 
mobility in Europe. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two offers a brief review of the literature on 
vertical linkages and geographical agglomeration, as well as the spatial competition 
foundations of the NEG, in an attempt to combine the two approaches. The third section 
presents the model to be estimated. In the fourth section the estimation method is discussed 
and some hypotheses are presented and contrasted. Section five describes the database and the 
variables used in the estimation. The last two sections present the results and the conclusions. 
 
 
2 Competition, vertical linkages and agglomeration 
 
In his study of the phenomenon of industrial location, Marshall (1890) suggested that the 
geographical concentration of an industry allows the emergence in the vicinity of specialized 
producers of intermediate goods. A closely related idea, discussed by Stigler (1951), is that 
the spatial concentration of an industry can motivate vertical disintegration, that is to say, the 
tendency to obtain inputs through market exchanges with specialized suppliers instead of 
manufacturing them inside the company. 
 
Following Adam Smith’s famous theorem on the division of labour and the size of the market, 
Stigler (1951) demonstrated that when buyers and sellers concentrate geographically there are 
efficiency gains due to the greater specialization in the production of intermediate goods. 
Fujita (1990) formalized the argument using a model in which the production of final goods 
exhibits preference for variety of intermediate goods produced with decreasing average costs. 
A large industrial scale reduces production costs by means of a wide variety of specialized 
intermediate inputs. 
 
Marshall and Stigler’s idea that geographic concentration facilitates the emergence of a 
variety of specialized suppliers has given rise to an impressive body of theoretical literature. 
However, empirical evidence to validate these ideas has not developed at the same pace1. 
Case studies and other anecdotes have illustrated the emergence of specialized suppliers and 
have defined the phenomenon of vertical disintegration for specific cases of highly 
                                                 
1 Duch (2004) surveys the empirical literature on the relationship between vertical integration and location. 
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agglomerated industries. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether these examples are 
common practices or in fact just represent isolated cases. 
 
From a strategic point of view, firms’ location decisions depend on the trade-off between 
production costs and access to markets2. When trade costs are low, for example when a 
certain degree of integration exists between the different areas under study, firms are highly 
sensitive to differences in production costs. In contrast, in the presence of high trade costs, i.e. 
before the adoption of measures of trade liberalization, firms are tied to the markets and their 
location decisions are much less sensitive to costs differentials. At intermediate levels of trade 
costs, the distribution of firms in an imperfectly competitive industry is biased toward 
locations with better market access. These locations can, therefore, maintain greater real 
wages than other less central territories, as Krugman (1980) and Krugman and Venables 
(1990) have demonstrated. 
 
Nevertheless, this observation is only moderately interesting until combined with the actions 
of other economic agents. For example, Krugman (1991a, b) adds labour mobility to the 
picture. This enables locations close to bigger markets to offer higher real wages than those 
paid by firms in distant regions because the latter face higher transport costs if they want to 
sell their products in more dense markets. Thus, higher real wages attracts workers; this 
increases the market size and, in turn, causes a greater concentration of economic activity. 
 
However, this explanation seems not to apply in the case of the European Union, since the 
degree of labour mobility is low – not only between different member states, but also within 
regions of the same country. But as Venables (1996), Ekholm and Forslid (1997) and Amiti 
(2001) have demonstrated, labour mobility is not the only factor that explains market size in 
different locations. If industries are vertically related through an input-output structure, then 
final producers form the market for intermediate goods. In this situation, market access 
considerations will push intermediate firms toward those regions with a relatively high share 
of final firms. In the same way, a high concentration of intermediate firms in a region will act 
as a centripetal force for final firms, because of the savings in transporting the inputs 
necessary for production. 
 
Although the mechanisms of attraction and repulsion are clear in the NEG literature, the 
process of local (as well as spatial) competition is modelled rather rudimentarily. We know 
from spatial competition models that strategic interactions between firms are fundamental 
factors in the competition process in spatial markets. In the basic model of Hotelling (1929) 
when there is no price competition and decisions are simultaneous, market share rivalry 
induces firms to agglomerate. On the other hand, in the Hotelling model with quadratic costs 
                                                 
2 As a modelling strategy for both traditional spatial competition and NEG models, spatial equilibrium is the 
outcome of the interplay between a set of dispersion forces and a set of agglomeration forces. For the sake of 
clarity, in what follows we will not enumerate all these forces. Readers interested can consult Fujita and Thisse 
(2002). 
 5
[d'Aspremont et al. (1979)] where firms choose location in the first stage and compete in 
prices in the second stage, the incentives to move away from competitors in order to relax 
price competition dominates the market share effect, leading firms to maximize their spatial 
differentiation (dispersion). Therefore, a basic conclusion in this approach is that price 
competition acts as an important centrifugal force. 
 
If competition is relaxed, when products are imperfect substitutes due to their differentiation, 
for example, firms may find it strategically profitable to agglomerate. In contrast, if 
competition is defined by a Cournot setting and strategic interactions are less aggressive than 
under a Bertrand assumption, agglomeration is a general result, as shown by the partial 
equilibrium models of Anderson and Neven (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1990)3. 
 
In this way, the analysis of location patterns of vertically related firms not only requires the 
study of the mechanics of attraction and repulsion in terms of production costs and access to 
the markets, but should also consider the type of competition and the strategic interactions 
between firms, both horizontally and vertically. Therefore, the balance of centrifugal and 
centripetal forces has both a horizontal and a vertical component. Moreover, each one is 
defined on the basis of market access and production costs as well as on the basis of strategic 
interactions between vertically related firms. 
 
In this paper we draw on the NEIO4 literature to analyse the characteristics of spatial 
competition in regional industries throughout the European Union (EU). Note that our 
theoretical approach corresponds to ideas advanced by the different models of spatial 
competition. For instance, we know that the formation and the size of agglomerations depend 
on the relative balance of three different forces: i) the magnitude of agglomeration economies, 
mainly due to localization economies arising in a vertically integrated industry; ii) the 
intensity of spatial competition, and iii) the magnitude of transport costs. 
 
It is well known from the theory of industrial organization that geographical proximity 
increases competition, inducing firms to disperse5. This suggests that firms’ agglomeration or 
dispersion decisions depend on the relative intensity of localization economies and 
competition. Even if competition is relaxed, either through product differentiation in the case 
of price competition or by means of any form of collusive agreement (tacit or not) when 
competition  is defined by market shares, firms will still want to disperse if transport costs are 
high. In a context where trade costs are decreasing, location decisions will then be defined by 
the balance between economies of agglomeration and the intensity of competition, not only 
with neighbouring firms, but also with distant firms that can penetrate the local market by 
means of exports. 
                                                 
3 Under certain assumptions, this result does not hold (see Chamorro-Rivas, 2000). 
4 New Empirical Industrial Organization, the term used by Bresnahan (1989) and others. 
5 Although this has been a general and robust result in the spatial competition literature since d’Aspremont et al. 
(1979), the size of the spatial units used in the empirical analysis requires us to proceed with care. See section 5 
and the appendix for a detailed description. 
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If firms and consumers are geographically dispersed and if the number of firms is small in 
relation to demand, for example due to the existence of indivisibilities in production, each 
firm can exploit a certain degree of market power in its local market. In other words, the 
presence of returns to scale prevents regional markets from being perfectly competitive 
because the differences in consumption location and, therefore, in transport costs, are a source 
of market power. Spatial competition is necessarily imperfect and should be studied in the 
appropriate context and with the appropriate models. Having recognized this, the balance of 
forces between transport costs and the organization of production is fundamental for the 
determination of the number of firms that compete in a region with a given population. 
 
The essence of spatial competition was probably better described by Kaldor (1935), who 
argued that location decisions of firms determine the nature of competition between them in a 
specific way: regardless of the number of firms that operate in the industry as a whole, 
competition is localized because each company competes more intensely with its neighbours 
than with distant firms. Thus, spatial competition is inherently strategic, since each firm must 
worry about the behaviour of a small number of direct competitors, independently of the total 
number of firms in the industry. This suggests that the industry is not formed by independent 
clusters of firms: given the strategic interdependences between firms and their input-output 
complementarity relationships, all clusters are interrelated by a complex network of 
interactions. 
 
Unfortunately, models of spatial competition are plagued by the frequent non-existence of 
equilibrium in pure strategies (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992). Research has therefore faced a 
modelling trade-off: either to appeal to mixed strategies, or to use monopolistic competition in 
which interactions between firms are weak. For the sake of simplicity, NEG models have 
retained the second option – which is not unreasonable once we address spatial issues at a 
macro-level. In addition, models of monopolistic competition have shown a rare ability to 
deal with a large variety of issues related to economic geography, which are otherwise 
unsatisfactorily treated by the competitive paradigm (Matsuyama, 1995). However, it should 
be kept in mind that spatial competition should not be ignored at the micro-level. 
 
From these observations, and making use of the methodology proposed by the empiric 
literature on conjectural variations, we estimate the degree of perceived competition in a set of 
European regions and industries. We distinguish between conjectures related to horizontal 
competition – both local and with firms located in other regions (which we term “external”) – 
and those formed by the vertical relationships between final and intermediate firms. Thus, the 
first of these effects will indicate whether or not the European market is still segmented. The 
second effect, according to the postulates of the NEG, could give some idea of the 
intermediate input intensity as an agglomeration force. 
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3 Spatial competition and agglomeration: the model 
 
The starting point of the empirical analysis is an industry distributed geographically in 
different regions. In region j, there are Nj firms that produce a final homogeneous good q 
from a homogeneous intermediate good x. The inverse demand function for final goods in 
region j is given by 
 
),( zQpp j =  
 
where pj is the final good price in region j, Q is total quantity produced by industry, 
comprising the quantity of the final good produced in region j (Qj) and the quantity produced 
in other regions (Q-j), and z is a vector of demand shifters. It is assumed that the technology 
used for the transformation of the intermediate input into a final good is one of fixed 
coefficients where a 1:1 relationship is established, so that the production of final and 
intermediate goods can be represented by the same variable6. 
 
The technology of the final stage of production is represented by means of the cost function 
k(q,w), where w is the vector of factor prices and q the quantity produced by the individual 
firm. The intermediate good is produced in a vertically related industry characterized by a 
quantity setting oligopoly with a cost function c(x,w) where x is the quantity of intermediate 
goods produced. It is assumed that the market for intermediate goods is perfectly integrated 
and, in this case, no transport costs are incurred to acquire an intermediate input produced in 
distant regions7. If this industry sets prices according to a mark-up over an average marginal 
cost, ),(' wxc+μ  (for 0≥μ ), the profit function of each final producer located in j is 
 [ ] ),(),(' wqkqwxcp ijij −−−= μπ  
 
Assuming that each final producer chooses q to maximize profits, first order conditions would 
be 
 
),(')1)(,('')1(),(' wxcwxcq
Q
p
qwqkp iii
j
ij ++++∂
∂−=− θφμ  
 
where c’’(x,w) is the second derivative of the intermediate firm cost function, iφ  is firm i’s  
conjectural variation parameter with respect to local and external competition, iθ  is firm i’s 
conjectural variation parameter with respect to intermediate firms. 
 
                                                 
6 This allows us to obviate the problem caused by the scarcity of statistical data at regional level. 
7 This is consistent with empirical evidence in international trade where tariffs are usually greater for final than 
for intermediate goods. Note that this assumption implies that intermediate goods are not spatially differentiated. 
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If we multiply the first order condition for profit maximization by ji Qq , sum over all firms 
and divide by pj , we have the following relationship  
 
jj
jj
j
jj
j p
wxc
p
wxcHQ
HS
M ),(')1(),('')1(* +Θ++Φ+−= ημ   (1) 
 
where Mj is the industry’s weighted price cost margin in region j, Sj is the regional share in 
total industry’s production, Hj is Herfindhal’s industrial concentration index in region j, jη is 
the price elasticity with respect to the industry’s total quantity demanded, and  is the firms’ 
(share) weighted conjectural variation in the final goods market. This conjecture is composed 
by the weighted conjectural variation with respect to firms located in the same region 
(
Φ
ij qQ ∂∂ ) and by the weighted conjectural variation with respect to external competition 
(firms located outside the region, ij qQ ∂∂ − ). The parameter Θ  is the weighted conjectural 
variation with respect to the intermediate goods market8. 
 
For the empirical implementation, we assume that the corresponding intermediate goods cost 
function adopts the Generalized Leontief functional form and therefore becomes 
 
∑∑ += iijiij wxwwxwxc βα 22/1)(),(    (2) 
 
where, by symmetry, it is assumed that jiij αα = . Substituting (2) in (1), and using the 
equality q = x (1:1 relationship between intermediate and final goods) we obtain the 
industry’s aggregate price cost margin equation as the equilibrium relationship in region j as 
 
∑ ∑∑ ++Θ++Φ+−= −
j
i
ijjj
j
ji
ij
j
i
ijj
j
jj
j p
w
HSQ
p
ww
p
w
HQS
HS
M βαβημ 2
)(
)1(2)1(
2/1
*  
(3) 
 
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of the equation represents the margin over 
marginal cost that intermediate firms charge when taking advantage of market power. The 
second term measures the oligopolist distortion in the final goods market. We see that this 
distortion is positively influenced by the region’s share in the industry’s total output. The 
third term shows the possibility that final firms exercise some type of oligopsony power in the 
intermediate market, measured by the corresponding conjectural variation parameter. The rest 
of the expression represents parameters of the intermediate stage cost function. 
 
                                                 
8 Recall that it has been assumed, basically due to the lack of detailed statistical information at the Europe-wide 
regional level, that the market for intermediate goods is perfectly integrated; so there is no spatial differentiation. 
Thus, it can be supposed that input purchases are carried out exclusively in the region in which the purchasing 
company is located. 
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In order to identify the parameters of the price cost margin equation in region j, it is necessary 
to jointly estimate the corresponding demand function: 
 
tjjjj yypppQ lnlnlnlnlnln 4322110 ηηηηηη +++++=   (4) 
 
where 0η  is the intercept, pj the price in region j,  the price of complements,  the price 
of substitutes, y
1p 2p
j is per capita income in region j and yt is average per capita income in the EU. 
Equations (3) and (4) augmented with the corresponding error terms form the spatial 
competition model to be estimated. 
 
 
4 Estimation of the model and hypothesis testing 
 
As already pointed out, the spatial competition model to be estimated is formed by two 
equations. In the first place, equation (3) represents the industry’s supply relationship in 
region j, and mainly depends on aggregate quantity, industrial concentration and the share of 
the region in total sectoral output, as well as on some cost function parameters. The presence 
of the price-elasticity of demand in the second RHS term makes this equation non-linear in 
the parameters. Moreover, the aggregate quantity is the dependent variable of the demand 
equation, and thus forms a system of simultaneous equations. In this context, endogenous 
variables are correlated with disturbances in such a way that an instrumental variables 
estimator is needed to gain consistency. 
 
Three techniques are generally used for joint estimation of the entire system of equations in 
the presence of cross-equation correlations of the disturbances: three stage least squares 
(3SLS), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML). The first is an instrumental variable method for estimating systems of simultaneous 
equations where there may be endogenous variables in the RHS as well as contemporaneous 
correlation of the disturbances. The advantage of 3SLS over FIML is that the model does not 
have to be completely specified; the estimates for the equations and parameters can be 
consistent even if the exact form of the rest of the model is unknown9. Besides, 3SLS is far 
easier to compute than FIML and the benefit in computational ease comes at no cost in terms 
of asymptotic efficiency10. 
 
Thus, parameter identification requires joint, and preferably simultaneous, estimation of the 
price-cost margin equation and the demand function. Given the non-linearity of the margin 
equation and the endogeneity of some of the variables composing the system, specifically the 
relationship between the price-cost margin and the local concentration index, non-linear three 
                                                 
9 For example, FIML would require additional equations for each of the exogenous variables; 3SLS estimates are 
consistent with the choice of suitable instruments. 
10 If disturbances are homoskedastic GMM estimates are asymptotically the same as 3SLS. 
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stage least squares (N3SLS) is the most appropriate method for estimation purposes11. The 
endogenous variables are Mj, Q, and Hj. The exogenous variables are Sj, wk, wl, pj, p1, p2, yj 
and yt. We use the first lagged value of the endogenous variables as well as the full set of 
exogenous variables as instruments12. 
 
The model outlined in the previous section allows analysis of the competitive behaviour of 
firms in space. However, the conjectural variation parameter in the final stage is composed by 
firms’ expectations with regard to the reactions of their local competitors and of firms located 
in other regions. Therefore, to be able to identify the parameters associated with each type of 
conjecture, we must modify the above specification in such a way as to obtain more 
information on the essential features of spatial competition. Thus, a simple modification is 
introduced to redefine the final stage conjectural variations parameter to include the market 
share of firms located outside the reference region and thus to account for the perceived 
degree of external competition. Hence, the following relationship captures the required 
modification 
 
jj SH −++=Φ 101 λλ  
 
The equation shows that the weighted conjectural variation in region j depends on the local 
Herfindhal index, while the weighted conjectural variation that reflects the degree of external 
competition is captured by means of the share of the rest of locations different to region j in 
the industry’s total production ( ). jS−
 
Another important element is the identification of certain effects that may play an important 
role in the spatial competition process and are thus relevant for the industry’s vertical 
organization structure and for the geographical concentration of production. Differentiating 
the price cost margin equation with respect to region j’s share of production in total industry, 
Sj, we obtain the effect of spatial concentration on the margin (assuming that conjectural 
variations are constant in time): 
 
∑ ∑+Θ++Φ+−=∂
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) is the effect of a change in geographical 
concentration on the market power that final firms can exert in their local market (the market 
power effect). The second term represents the distortion between price and marginal cost in 
                                                 
11 It is also possible to iterate the 3SLS computation, but, unlike the standard estimation procedure, this method 
does not provide the maximum likelihood estimator nor does it improve the asymptotic efficiency. Consistency 
and asymptotic normality for this method-of-moments type estimator are proved in Jorgenson and Laffont 
(1974) and Gallant (1977). 
12 Actually, applying 3SLS to panel data is known as the Error Component Three Stages Least Squares 
(EC3SLS) estimation method. See Baltagi (1981). 
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the intermediate goods market, derived from the oligopsonist behaviour of final firms over the 
intermediate ones (the vertical externality effect). Finally, the third term on the right hand side 
of equation (5) is the effect of geographic concentration on intermediate goods production 
costs (the cost efficiency effect). 
 
 
5 Data and variables 
 
The model to be estimated comprises the price-cost margin equation, the demand function and 
the definition of the conjectural variations parameter. For estimation purposes, the following 
variables have been built: 
 
Price – cost margin (Mj): as in most empirical studies, this is approximated by the quotient 
of the difference of value added and compensation of employees over the value of production: 
 
VBP
RVABM j
−=  
 
Value added and compensation of employees were obtained from REGIO database for each 
sector and region. Thus, the value of production (VP) is the sum of value added and 
intermediate consumptions13. 
 
Herfindhal concentration index (Hj): given that there is no sufficiently detailed statistical 
information on individual firms’ production shares, this variable is approximated by its 
numbers equivalent: that is, the number of identical firms that generate a given value of the 
index. Thus, the index is 
 
n
H 1=  
 
The number of firms by region and sector is obtained from Eurostat’s Structural Business 
Statistics14. 
 
In the case of the demand function it was not possible to obtain prices at regional level. 
Therefore, prices are national averages by sector and are the same for all the regions of a 
country, but they differ by sectors. Moreover, regional and EU average per capita income is 
included in the demand function. Specifically we have the following 
 
                                                 
13 As a 1:1 relationship was assumed between final and intermediate goods, VP is just twice the value added. 
14 This measure of concentration may introduce some distortions in the results since we  consider that all firms 
are  the same size, meaning, in turn, that concentration is minimal. 
 12
Price of the good (pj):  Consumer price index for each country and each sector, from 
Eurostat. 
Price of complements (p1):  Weighted average consumer price index (CPI) for all sectors 
excluding the CPI of the reference sector in the reference country. 
Price of substitutes (p2):  Weighted average consumer price index for all countries excluding 
the CPI of the reference region (country). 
Regional and EU average per capita income (yj;yt): obtained directly from the REGIO 
database. 
 
The cost function requires the use of variables that approximate factor prices. It is assumed 
that the production of intermediate goods requires only labour and capital. These variables 
have been approximated by: 
 
Price of labour (wl): the quotient between compensation of employees and the number of 
workers by sector and region, index 1985=1. 
Price of capital (wk): to estimate this price we follow the methodology proposed by Oliveira-
Martins et al. (1999) based on the following formulation: 
 [ ] ke pir δπ +−= )(  
 
where r is the price of capital, i is the long run nominal interest rate,  is expected inflation, eπ
δ  is the depreciation rate (fixed at 5%) and  is the capital formation deflator. Since many 
required variables were not available at regional level, figures at national level were used. 
Data have been obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook. 
kp
 
In addition to these variables, market shares of each region and sector (in terms of value 
added) are used (Sj), as well as the quantities of final and intermediate goods, both estimated 
by value added (Q). A panel is built with 104 regions from 11 EU countries for 1985-1995 the 
period and for 9 manufacturing sectors. The regions included are listed in table A.1 and the 
sectors in table A.2 in the appendix15. 
 
 
6 Results 
 
The results of the estimation are presented in table 1. By assuming that the intermediate goods 
market is perfectly integrated, the number of parameters to estimate is reduced considerably. 
Therefore, only an average margin above marginal cost is estimated for intermediate goods, 
represented by μ. Moreover, a single sectoral conjectural variation parameter for the vertical 
                                                 
15 It should be stressed, however, that the degree of spatial disaggregation is not optimal, since NUTS1 and 
NUTS2 regions are too big to capture the subtlety of spatial competition effects. The same applies to the 
industrial classification used. However, for a European level analysis, these were the only data available. 
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relationships in the industry will be considered, in an attempt to determine whether the final 
producers enjoy some oligopsony power over intermediate firms. 
 
The results in table 1 show that the estimated parameters associated with the intermediate 
margin are statistically significant and intuitively interesting. In general, intermediate firms 
apply margins over marginal costs of about 20 and 30%, the largest being 29,86% in the 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals sector, and the smallest 21,6% in the Paper and 
printing sector. We can also confirm that in most sectors, final firms are price takers in the 
intermediate goods market as the parameters associated with weighted conjectural variations 
in this market are close to -1, the value for the conjecture associated with price taking 
behaviour. In four cases (Non metallic minerals and mineral products; Food, beverages and 
tobacco; Paper and printing and Products of various industries) the parameters obtained are 
not statistically different from zero, so we cannot rule out the possibility that in these sectors 
other types of behaviour are taking place (mainly Cournot-type conjectures), which means 
that final firms expect intermediate firms not to react to their strategic movements. In this 
situation we observe that, except for the Products of various industries sector, price cost 
margins in the intermediate goods market are smaller than in the rest, in which final firms are 
price takers16. 
 
The results also reveal that all the parameters associated with the price of complements have 
negative signs, as expected. Moreover, the price of substitutes has positive parameter 
estimates, except in the case of Food, beverages and tobacco. As for regional income 
elasticity, the majority of goods are normal (i.e., the sign of the parameter is positive) but in 
four sectors (Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals; Non metallic minerals and mineral 
products; Transport material and Food, beverages and tobacco) the signs are negative, 
indicating that in these cases the goods are inferior. Nevertheless, the parameters estimated in 
these last three cases are not statistically significant. In the case of average EU income 
elasticity, the only sectors that present negative parameter estimates are Ferrous and non 
ferrous ores and metals and Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear17. 
 
Conjectural variations are presented in figure 1. The figure shows the degree of competition 
perceived by the different manufacturing sectors. The horizontal axis measures the conjectural 
variation with respect to local competition whereas the vertical axis shows the expected 
reactions regarding external competition (i.e. from firms located outside the region). The 
negative relationship found for all sectors means that when local competition is stronger, 
industries try to exploit market power in distant markets, maybe through cooperative 
agreements or by collusive behaviour. Regions with a high degree of local competition (when 
                                                 
16 In a vertical oligopoly setting, the balance of forces when both upstream and downstream producers have 
market power is indeterminate. A future step in this direction would require the design of a Nash-bargaining 
solution in the intermediate goods market 
17 Own price elasticity is not presented in the table because it was estimated for each region in order to identify 
the market power parameter in the price-cost margin equation and it is used to recover the conjectural variation 
parameter. These and other estimates omitted are available from the author upon request. 
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the parameter of the conjectural variation referring to local competition is close to or greater 
than -1) present conjectural variations in relation to external competition close to zero, 
indicating that local industries do not expect neighbouring competitors to react to their 
strategic movements. 
 
 
Table 1. Estimation results 
 S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  S7  S8  S9  
I. Price-cost margin equation (dependent variable is Mj) 
α11 -0.064 *** 0.191 0.122* 0.135*** 0.148*** -0.004 0.185*** 0.061* -0.002 
 (-9.178) (1.354) (1.653) (5.903) (3.459) (-0.181) (4.632) (1.949) (-0.042) 
α22 -0.062 *** 0.114 0.028 0.038*** 0.059** -0.032 0.065* 0.009* -0.135***
 (-7.673) (0.855) (0.422) (3.218) (2.208) (-1.324) (1.944) (1.716) (-2.762) 
α12 -0.029 *** -0.390 -0.283** -0.284*** -0.380*** -0.009 -0.363*** -0.173*** 0.029 
 (-2.688) (-1.439) (-2.011) (-6.884) (-5.299) (-0.230) (-4.769) (-3.980) (0.273) 
β1 -0.017 *** 0.0004 0.0004 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.005*** -0.0001 
 (-6.834) (0.100) (0.671) (-0.674) (-1.012) (-3.194) (-4.973) (3.232) (-0.214) 
β2 -0.018 *** 0.000 0.001* -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
 (-5.567) (0.147) (1.713) (-2.620) (-3.642) (-1.196) (-0.886) (-1.598) (0.332) 
μ 0.299 *** 0.228*** 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.246*** 0.227*** 0.267*** 0.216*** 0.298***
 (54.633) (34.941) (38.999) (17.608) (21.031) (34.940) (37.993) (33.921) (53.348) 
Θ -0.998 *** -0.998 -0.997** -1.001*** -1.024*** -1.001 -1.001*** -0.999* -0.967* 
 (-6.273) (-0.359) (-2.441) (-3.233) (-2.708) (-1.385) (-3.637) (-1.871) (-1.749) 
          
II. Demand equation (dependent variable is lnQ) 
η0 21.866 *** 5.213*** 6.903*** 8.877*** 5.831*** 6.602*** 11.482*** 5.275*** 9.194***
 (38.312) (20.277) (22.002) (54.557) (22.361) (85.788) (54.093) (43.882) (49.501) 
η1 -8.375 *** -4.471*** -4.471*** -3.453*** -6.231*** -0.200*** -3.324*** -2.552*** -5.911***
 (-26.202) (-27.741) (-28.791) (-25.029) (-29.631) (-3.432) (-22.840) (-26.371) (-63.068) 
η2 10.754 *** 3.222*** 3.378*** 2.391*** 4.978*** -0.747*** 2.344*** 1.102*** 5.449***
 (29.188) (17.187) (17.441) (15.998) (21.047) (-13.495) (14.466) (9.335) (49.861) 
η3 -0.018 ** -0.0004 0.006* 0.013*** -0.005 -0.00002 0.003 0.010*** 0.002 
 (-2.085) (-0.088) (1.657) (3.322) (-0.846) (-0.012) (0.795) (3.821) (0.729) 
η4 -1.213 *** 0.591*** 0.472*** 0.368*** 0.575*** 0.525*** -0.032*** 0.602*** 0.214***
 (-19.604) (20.628) (13.893) (19.765) (19.569) (61.286) (-1.341) (43.603) (10.516) 
                                      
Notes: asymptotic t-statistic in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99 
percent, respectively. The results are based on the joint estimation of the sector by sector set of equations (3) and 
(4) by means of the nonlinear three stages least squares (N3SLS) method. The codes for the different sectors are 
shown in table A.2 in the appendix. N=104, T=11 for 1985 to 1995. 
 
 
 
 15
We also find the opposite situation, in which local industries are less competitive but perceive 
that they face a stronger competition coming from contiguous or neighbouring regions. From 
the figure we observe that, in general terms, competition from local markets is perceived to be 
more intense than that from external markets. Most of the conjectures estimated for local 
competition are around -1 or below, which means that the intensity of the competition in the 
territory is high. So, in aggregate terms, firms do not expect their strategic movements to have 
consequences for prices, so it is not possible to exploit market power. On the other hand, 
perceived competition regarding external markets is more volatile. There are sectors that 
perceive that the firms located in other regions will act cooperatively, adapting their supply to 
the decisions taken by the firm located in the reference region. There are regional industries as 
well that estimate that their strategic movements will not induce their rivals to respond 
(Cournot) and in certain regions there are even sectors that also perceive greater competition 
in external markets and act as price takers. 
 
The figure also shows the relationship between perceived competition in local and external 
markets. All sectors show an inverse relationship between local and external competition. 
This means that the stronger the perceived competition is in the local market, the higher the 
expected market power in external markets that industries think they can exploit, acting 
collusively in (price or) quantity setting. The inverse relationship between local and external 
competition shows that there is at least one source of market power for regional industries. If 
supranormal profits cannot be obtained in the local market, due to the intensity of competition 
in the region, they can be sought by exploiting market power elsewhere in the partially 
integrated market. 
 
Table 2 relates the estimated conjectural variations with the changes observed in the 
geographical concentration of European industry in the 1985-1995 period. On average, 
conjectural variations with respect to local competition are around -1, indicating an average 
price taking behaviour in most of the local industrial markets. On the other hand, average 
perceived conjectural variations in competition from external markets are all near 0, 
suggesting that on average regional industries do not expect firms located in other territories, 
collectively, to respond to strategic movements. In a sense this result indicates a high degree 
of market segmentation in European industrial markets, since strategic action undertaken by 
an industry in a region do not seem to be compensated by strategic movements by firms 
located in other regions. Finally, given the homogeneity of local and external conjectural 
variation parameter estimates, there is no evidence of a relationship between the degree of 
competition and changes in the geographical concentration of the industry. 
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Table 2. Change in geographical concentration 1985 -1995 and aggregate conjectural variations 
 Geographic  Conjectural Variations 
 Concentration  Local External 
Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals -0.076  -1.259 0.219 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products 0.005  -1.195 0.256 
Chemical products -0.007  -1.275 0.218 
Metal products, machinery and equipment -0.010  -0.945 0.005 
Transport equipment -0.016  -0.886 -0.102 
Food, beverages and tobacco -0.017  -1.008 0.024 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear -0.050  -1.047 0.065 
Paper and printing products 0.036  -1.082 0.082 
Products of various industries 0.009  -0.975 -0.054 
Total -0.015  -1.075 0.079 
Notes: Geographic concentration was calculated for value added with an entropy index. The corresponding 
column shows the difference between the value of the index in 1995 relative to that for 1985. Thus a negative 
number indicates an increase in spatial concentration of production. Bold face numbers, hence, indicate the 
sectors that were more geographically concentrated in 1995 than in 1985. Local and external aggregated 
conjectural variation parameters are region-weighted averages from those obtained in the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
Finally, the effects of greater geographical concentration on market power in final and 
intermediate markets as well as the effects on intermediate goods production costs are 
analysed. As we have already seen, table 1 indicates that the conjectural variations parameter 
in the intermediate goods market is statistically equal to -1 in six of the nine sectors, so for 
these industries the effect is null. For the three remaining sectors we cannot rule out the 
possibility that final firms may behave oligopsonistically in the intermediate goods market. 
To simplify, it is assumed that this distortion is null in all sectors. We therefore compare the 
two remaining effects, market power and cost efficiency, on the industry’s weighted price-
cost margin. The results are shown in figure 2. 
 
The first thing to note from the panels in figure 2 is that the market power effect is always 
negative, as suggested by theory. In other words, an increase in the geographic concentration 
of production reduces the market power of firms located in the now more agglomerated 
region since it intensifies competition among firms. Nevertheless, this effect is composed by 
both local and external market power. Although the results are not explained here, theory 
suggests that firms’ local market power will decrease because of the increase in the intensity 
of competition in the more agglomerated region while at the same time their market power 
will increase in external markets, since in these markets the intensity of competition tends to 
diminish. The results obtained here show that the first of these effects is stronger than the 
second one and that, on aggregate, greater geographical concentration tends to moderate the 
market power of local firms. This is so because it is difficult to penetrate distant markets via 
exports, since exports incur additional transport costs. On the other hand, the effect of a 
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higher spatial industrial concentration on the intermediate costs of production is less clear and 
presents less dispersion. We observe sectors where the effect is null or almost null but others 
where the impact is substantial. 
 
In figure 2 it is possible to distinguish three groups of activities. First are those in which the 
majority of the regions have negative market power and cost efficiency effects, that is, both 
market power and costs are reduced (e.g. Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals; Metal 
products, machinery and equipment and Paper and printing products). The second group 
present a greater variability of the market power effect but a null or almost null effect on 
intermediate production costs. These include Non metallic minerals and mineral products, 
Chemical products and Products of various industries sectors. Finally, the third group 
comprises activities that present a stronger impact on intermediate production costs, usually a 
negative impact, while the market power effect shows higher dispersion. This group 
comprises Transport equipment, Food, beverages and tobacco and Textiles and clothing, 
leather and footwear. 
 
The total effect, calculated as the sum of the market power and the cost efficiency effects, is 
always negative, indicating that a greater geographical concentration of production partially 
reduces the distortion caused by final firms’ market power by intensifying competition at this 
stage of the productive process and provoking, at the same time, an average increase in the 
efficiency with which intermediate goods are produced. The source of these efficiency gains, 
associated with the geographical concentration of the final production, is a process of 
geographical concentration in the production of intermediate goods, as predicted by vertical 
linkage NEG models18. The cost complementarities of the agglomerated production of final 
and intermediate goods are reflected in the savings in the costs of transporting the 
intermediate goods and in the creation and consolidation of external economies in the 
territory. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Nevertheless, the data at hand do not allow us to test this hypothesis. 
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To determine whether this is the case, table 3 relates the changes in geographical 
concentration of the different manufacturing activities with (weighted) average market power 
and cost efficiency effects for each industry. The table indicates that the cost efficiency effect 
means that a higher geographical concentration of production increases productive efficiency 
because of the reduction of the costs of manufacturing intermediate goods. This efficiency 
necessarily is passed on to the final stage, since we have supposed that final firms are price 
takers. 
 
 
Table 3. The effects of geographic concentration on market power and cost efficiency 
 Geographic  Effects 
 Concentration  Market power Cost efficiency 
Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals -0.076  -0.0786 -0.0798 
Non-metallic minerals and mineral products 0.005  -0.1401 0.0000 
Chemical products -0.007  -0.1944 0.0189 
Metal products, machinery and equipment -0.010  -0.0161 -0.0228 
Transport equipment -0.016  -0.2644 -0.0273 
Food, beverages and tobacco -0.017  -0.4179 -0.0305 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear -0.050  -0.4080 -0.0420 
Paper and printing products 0.036  -0.0139 0.0093 
Products of various industries 0.009  -0.5437 -0.0005 
Total -0.015  -0.2308 -0.0194 
Notes: Geographic concentration was calculated for value added with an entropy index. The corresponding 
column shows the difference between the value of the index in 1995 relative to that for 1985. Thus a negative 
number indicates an increase in spatial concentration of production. Bold face numbers, hence, indicate the 
sectors more concentrated geographically in 1995 than in 1985. Market power and cost efficiency effects are 
region-weighted averages from those parameters obtained in the regression analysis. 
  
 
 
In five of the nine industries considered, an increase in the geographic concentration is 
observed between 1985 and 1995 along with an increase in the intermediate goods productive 
efficiency. These industries are Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals; Metal products, 
machinery and equipment; Transport equipment; Food, beverages and tobacco and Textiles 
and clothing, leather and footwear. Of the other industries Chemical products stands out, 
since the greater geographical concentration observed in the period 1985-1995 tends to 
increase the costs of production. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper a structural model is developed and estimated to analyse the vertical organization 
of firms in space, as well as the effect of this organization on the degree of competition and 
geographical agglomeration. The model is applied to the specific case of nine industries and 
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104 regions of the EU in the 1985-1995 period. The estimations are carried out for each 
manufacturing sector using panel data techniques with fixed effects to capture differences 
between regions. 
 
The estimated model is based on several results obtained from the spatial competition version 
of NEG theoretical models and, for the empirical implementation, on the empirical industrial 
organization literature. The system of equations developed and estimated allows analysis of 
diverse characteristics of industrial relationships in the different European regions considered. 
Of particular relevance are the estimated conjectural variations reflecting the degree of 
average perceived competition inside a sector, in both local and external markets. It is also 
possible to analyse the effects of  greater geographical concentration on the market power of 
firms and on production costs of intermediate goods. 
 
The results show that, in general, intermediate firms apply price-cost margins of between 20 
and 30%. They also confirm that in most sectors final firms are price takers in the 
intermediate goods market. All the parameters associated with the price of complements have 
the expected sign (negative) and almost the same occurs with the price of substitutes, though 
their estimated coefficients are positive. The regional per capita income elasticity indicates 
that goods are normal except in the case of four sectors in which they turn out to be inferior. 
 
The estimated conjectural variations present heterogeneous results, from which it is difficult 
to highlight clear patterns between the different regions and the different sectors. However, 
when the different degrees of perceived competition are reported for the different 
manufacturing sectors, both local and external, we observe that, in general terms, the expected 
competition from local markets is more intense than that from external markets. An inverse 
relationship is also observed between local and external competition in all sectors, indicating 
that the greater the perceived competition in the local market, the higher the market power 
that the industries feel they can exploit in external markets. This would suggest that firms 
always exploit some source of market power; when supranormal profits cannot be gained in 
local markets due to the intensity of competition in the region, they can be obtained by 
exploiting market power in other regions. 
 
The relationship between the estimated conjectural variations and the changes in geographical 
concentration of European industry in the period 1985-1995 shows that, on average, 
conjectural variations with respect to local competition are close to -1, indicating a price 
taking behaviour in most local industrial markets. On the other hand, conjectural variations 
with respect to external competition are in the vicinity of 0, suggesting that, on average, 
regional industries do not expect firms located in other territories to respond collectively to 
strategic movements. This result indicates a significant degree of segmentation in the 
European markets. However, there is no evidence of a close relationship between the degree 
of competition and the changes in the geographical concentration of industry. 
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The effects of geographical concentration on market power and the cost efficiency of 
intermediate goods suggest that it is always negative, as theory suggests. This indicates that 
an increase in the share of production of a given region in a specific sector reduces the market 
power of the firms located there because inter-firm competition is intensified in this region. 
On the other hand, the effect of a greater spatial concentration on the intermediate goods costs 
of production does not present a clear pattern and shows less dispersion. In some sectors the 
effect is null or almost null, but in others its impact is quite substantial. The total effect, 
calculated as the sum of the two, is always negative, indicating that the geographical 
concentration of the industry mitigates the distortion derived from final firms’ market power 
by increasing the degree of local competition and allowing efficiency increases in the 
production of the intermediate goods. One of the possible sources of these earnings may be 
the decision to co-locate final and intermediate production, allowing cost complementarities 
of specialized and agglomerated production to arise. 
 
Finally, a word of caution is compulsory. Though the results obtained in this paper offer 
interesting insights concerning spatial competition and its effects on agglomeration, both the 
spatial and the sectoral disaggregation used are far from optimal because of data availability 
constraints, a fact that may reduce the explanatory power of the estimates. Moreover, a 
stronger empirical spatial structure is needed to determine the perceived degree of 
competition more accurately. The use of spatial econometrics techniques would provide 
interesting results. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Regions included 
Germany (NUTS 1) Belgium (NUTS 2)
Baden-Württemberg Niedersachsen Région Bruxelles Brabant Wallon 
Bayern Nordrhein-Westfalen Antwerpen Hainaut 
Berlin Rheinland-Pfalz Limburg Liège 
Bremen Saarland Oost-Vlaanderen Luxembourg-B 
Hamburg Schleswig-Holstein Vlaams Brabant Namur 
Hessen  West-Vlaanderen
Spain (NUTS 2) France (NUTS 2)
Galicia Castilla-la Mancha Île de France Pays de la Loire 
Asturias Extremadura Champagne-Ardenne Bretagne 
Cantabria Cataluña Picardie Poitou-Charentes 
País Vasco C. Valenciana Haute-Normandie Aquitaine 
Navarra Baleares Centre Midi-Pyrénées 
La Rioja Andalucía Basse-Normandie Limousin 
Aragón Murcia Bourgogne Rhône-Alpes 
C. de Madrid Canarias Nord - Pas-de-Calais Auvergne 
Castilla y León  Lorraine Languedoc-Roussillon
Italy (NUTS 2) Alsace Provence-Alpes-C. 
Piemonte Marche Franche-Comté Corse 
Valle d`Aosta Lazio United Kingdom (NUTS 1)
Liguria Abruzzo North East West Midlands 
Lombardia Molise Yorkshire and Humberside North West 
Trentino-Alto Adige Campania East Midlands Wales 
Veneto Puglia East Anglia Scotland 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia Basilicata South East Northern Ireland 
Emilia-Romagna Calabria South West
Toscana Sicilia Netherlands (NUTS 1)
Umbria Sardegna Noord-Nederland West-Nederland 
Portugal (NUTS 2) Oost-Nederland Zuid-Nederland 
Norte Alentejo Denmark
Centro  Algarve Ireland
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo Luxembourg-GD
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Table A.2 NACE RR-17 classification. Industry 
Code Sector 
S1 Ferrous and non ferrous ores and metals 
S2 Non-metallic minerals and mineral products 
S3 Chemical products 
S4 Metal products, machinery and equipment 
S5 Transport equipment 
S6 Food, beverages and tobacco 
S7 Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear 
S8 Paper and printing products 
S9 Products of various industries 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
